Philobiblon

Recently out, and as readable as his earlier Austerity Britain is David Kynaston’s Modernity Britain: 1957-59.

A few highlights…

“In theory, there was ‘parity of esteem’ between the roughly 1,200 grammar schools and 3,800 secondary moderns. In practice, not only did most people view the secondary moderns as vastly inferior, but there was a shocking relative shortfall in their resourcing. ‘It is likely’ noted John Vaizey in his 1958 treatise The Costs of Education, ‘that the average Grammar school child receives 170 per cent more per year, in terms of resources, than the average Modern school child. …The gulf in expectations was even greater. Surveying in 1961 that year’s school-leavers from a semi-skilled and unskilled background at five Leicestershire schools (two grammars and three secondary moderns), William Liversidge found that 93 per cent of the grammar boys anticipated moving into a higher class of employment than their parents – whereas only 18 per cent of the secondary modern boys did. ‘The general conclusion … is one of a startlingly accurate appraisal of life chances by the children … a shrewd appreciation of the social and economic implication of their placing within the educational system.’ … Social class … did much to determine outcomes within grammars. In 1954 an official report on Early Leaving found that whereas children from the semi-skilled and unskilled working class represented over 20 per cent of grammar school intakes, but the sixth form that proportion was down to barely 7 per cent.” (pp. 218-219)

“On the morning of 5 December, two days after the pit-closures announcement, Macmillan inaugurated the 8.5-mile Preston Bypass, Britain’s first stretch of motorway, and, subsequently, part of the M6. ‘In the years to come,’ the PM declared, ‘the county and the country alike may look at the Preston Bypass – a fine thing in itself but a finer thing as a symbol – as a token of what is to follow’: pressing a button, he cut the traditional tape by remote control … he was driven along in a Rolls-Royce Landau.” (p. 259)

“Shortly after Christmas the government announced the full convertability of sterling held by non-residents … Although the announcement itself provoked no great controversy, Anthony Crosland would state the potential downside forcibly in a Third Programme talk in early February. Claiming (probably correctly) that the ‘strongest pressure’ behind the decision had come from the Bank of England and the City, wanting convertability ‘in order to enhance the position of London as a world banker and financial centre,’ he called it a ‘disastrous approach’ – given not only that ‘the financial earnings of the City from overseas business are trivial in relation to our balance of payments’ but that ‘every step in the direction [i.e. of financial liberalisation, ultimately leading to the end of exchange controls] increases our vulnerability to speculation’. And: ‘The really serious thing about all this is that our domestic policies are increasingly dictated by the holders of sterling – by bankers in Zurich and London, by speculators all over the world, and by traders using sterling as an international trading currency. These people are not, unfortunately, as the City likes to think they are, highly rational and sophisticated judges of the true state of the British economy. On the contrary, they are often naive, volatile and ill-informed…Yet the fear of what they may do to sterling increasingly influences our Bank rate policy, our rate of economic expansion, our wages policy, and … even what taxation policy we are allowed to pursue.” (pp. 262-3)

On the 1959 election..

Why had the Conservatives won so conclusively? Some emphasised Gaitskell’s tax-pledge blunder, some the Conservatives’ much greater advertising spend during the long run-up to the election, some their greater organisational capacity in the decisive weeks. For Richard Crossman, writing up his diary on the Friday, one ‘simple truth’ had ‘dogged’ his party’s efforts: ‘Tory voters are far more afraid of another Labour Government than Labour voters are afraid of another Tory Government. The Tories were able to exploit fear of nationalisation, inflation, flight from the pound, trade unions and so on.’ Ultimately though, the most common – and surely correct – perception was that, whatever the attractions of otherwise of Labour’s case, the electorate just did not want to change horses at such a time of such welcome prosperity. … Trog drew a wonderful cartoon for the Spectator, showing Macmillan sitting in best Edwardian manner opposite an array of consumer durables (fridge, car, washing machine, TV set) and saying ‘Well, gentlemen, I think we all fought a good fight …” (pp. 165-6)